Initiating Justice: The Role of Judicial Institutions in the Pursuit of Democratic Accountability

 

The study of judicial systems that check and balance concentrated power has become increasingly urgent in recent decades, as economic forces continue to be globally monopolized and as populist movements undermine democratic practices around the world.

While prior research on judicial independence has primarily focused on the role of independent courts and judges, it is critical to note that even the most independent judge cannot deliver just decisions if trials against powerful entities are never initiated. This dissertation, therefore, addresses this gap in the literature by examining the conditions that lead to the initiation of trials against the “untouchables.”

The subsequent three papers delve into: (1) the mechanism through which prosecutors determine which cases to litigate against major economic powers, (2) the conditions that lead political incumbents to limit their influence over anti-corruption activities, such as investigation and prosecution of public figures for corruption, and (3) the rationale behind why certain countries grant extensive judicial immunity to politicians, while others provide limited or no immunity.

  • How Do Public Agencies Respond to Budgetary Control? A Theory of Strategic Task Portfolio in Public Administration

    Budgetary control is a commonly used tool for elected politicians to gain control over bureaucracy. Yet, it creates a dilemma for agencies: how can public agencies maintain their diverse programs while simultaneously improving performance measures with fewer resources? In response to a budget reduction, I argue that agencies concentrate more on efficient tasks (i.e., antitrust criminal cases) to boost performance metrics at the expense of other types of antitrust litigation. To test these theoretical claims, I draw evidence from the data on antitrust litigation filed by the U.S. Antitrust Division from 1970 to 2019. Explore

  • Establishing Anti-Corruption Agencies: the Electoral Incentive for Self-Restraint Reforms

    In the second paper, I turn to the analysis at the cross-national level, exploring the conditions under which incumbents constrain themselves. By focusing on the establishment of anti-corruption agencies, I bridge two well-established, but seldom-integrated literatures: credible commitment and political insurance. Creating an ACA can enhance the credibility of an incumbent’s commitment to fighting corruption and maintaining honesty. But, the incumbent has an incentive to make such credible commitments only when faced with intense electoral competition. I test my theoretical arguments using the data on developing democracies from 1975 to 2012.

  • Self-Granting Immunity: When Do Politicians Grant Themselves Judicial Immunity?

    Judicial immunity for politicians has substantial implications on democracy and its resilience. However, no systematic research has been conducted to explain why some countries offer extensive immunity to politicians, while others provide narrower or no immunity. In this study, I develop a formal model that shows how the political climate in post-democratization shapes ruling elites’ incentives to strengthen or weaken immunity provisions for themselves. To evaluate my theoretical implications, I collect original data about constitutional immunity provisions in countries that underwent democratization since 1975.