The study of judicial systems that check and balance concentrated power has become increasingly urgent in recent decades, as economic forces continue to be globally monopolized and as populist movements undermine democratic practices around the world.
While prior research on judicial independence has primarily focused on the role of independent courts and judges, it is critical to note that even the most independent judge cannot deliver just decisions if trials against powerful entities are never initiated. This dissertation, therefore, addresses this gap in the literature by examining the conditions that lead to the initiation of trials against the “untouchables.”
The subsequent three papers delve into: (1) the mechanism through which prosecutors determine which cases to litigate against major economic powers, (2) the conditions that lead political incumbents to limit their influence over anti-corruption activities, such as investigation and prosecution of public figures for corruption, and (3) the rationale behind why certain countries grant extensive judicial immunity to politicians, while others provide limited or no immunity.